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Whether family control is beneficial for all shareholders or serves the family’s best interest at the 
expense of outside shareholders is still unclear, despite much research on this issue.1 In this 
paper, we shed new light on this topic by studying, around the world, whether and how family 
control affects valuation and corporate decisions during the 2008–2009 financial crisis.   
We argue that the unexpected liquidity shock from the financial crisis moves firms out of 
equilibrium in a way that magnifies both the benefits and costs of family control. With liquidity 
scarce, a family could add value by providing greater access to finance via other firms under its 
control. However, a family’s private benefits of control also can be affected by the crisis. A 
controlling family tends to be undiversified with its wealth tied up in the firm(s) it controls, and a 
liquidity shock can threaten the survival of the family empire. Relative to firms controlled by 
more diversified shareholders, family-controlled firms may be biased toward survival-oriented 
actions that help preserve the family’s control benefits at the expense of outside shareholders.   
We use a sample of more than 8,500 nonfinancial firms from thirty-five countries to test 
whether outside shareholders update their expectations regarding the benefit or cost of family 
control during a financial shock. Our results show that across countries family-controlled firms 
underperform relative to other firms during the 2008–2009 global financial crisis and that this 
result is robust to a variety of empirical specifications. In our baseline specification, buy-and-hold 
crisis period returns for family firms are 1.4 percentage points lower than for widely held firms 
and 3.3 percentage points lower than for firms with a nonfamily controlling blockholder. 
Collectively, the result that outside investors incrementally discount family firms indicates that 
during a crisis the cost of family control outweighs its benefit. 
                                                
1
 See Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung (2005) for a comprehensive survey. 
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We next explore the causes of this discount. As mentioned above, we hypothesize that 
private benefits of control become more costly to outside investors during a financial shock 
because survival of the family’s economic interests becomes a key factor driving the use of firm 
resources. To test this, we analyze the actions taken by firms relating to financing, investment, 
and labor policies, before and after the crisis, as well as precrisis firm characteristics indicative of 
high private benefits of control. 
We first explore whether family-controlled firms’ financing and investment decisions 
differ from other firms. On the financing side, family-controlled firms do not behave differently 
than other firms during the crisis in terms of their cash holdings, dividend policy, leverage, debt 
maturity, credit lines, and equity issues. Thus, we find no evidence that family control provides 
greater access to finance during an unexpected liquidity shock. On the investment side, we find 
that family-controlled firms reduce their capital expenditures to assets ratio by 0.52 percentage 
points relative to other firms. Our sample has a median capital-expenditures-to-assets ratio of 3.7 
percentage points, so this is equivalent to a 14% reduction in investment. We also show that firms 
that cut investment more have greater stock price declines during the crisis. This link between 
investment and stock price decline indicates that some productive investment is being cut. We 
next perform a mediation test that indicates that about one third of the underperformance of 
family firms is explained by underinvestment. Taken together, these tests show that the relative 
underperformance of family-controlled firms stems at least in part from decisions by families to 
reduce investment during the crisis.  
We next directly test the idea that families take survival-oriented actions by investigating 
whether a family group that controls equity in multiple sample firms intervenes in capital 
budgeting decisions in a way that enhances the chance for survival of the family’s network of 
firms. For multifirm family groups, we identify firms that are individually hit very hard by the 
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crisis. We then show that other firms in those groups cut their investment more than firms in 
family groups without any hard-hit members, and more than firms in non-family-controlled 
groups that do have hard-hit members. This evidence that severe financial distress in one family 
firm is associated with investment cuts in other healthier group firms is consistent with ensuring 
survival of the family empire but is unlikely to be in the best interest of the minority shareholders 
of the healthier firms in the group.  
We complete our analysis by assessing the extent to which underperformance is more 
pronounced in family firms for which outside investors would expect private benefits of control 
to be particularly costly. Given prior literature, investors may proxy for expected agency costs 
with variables that correspond to greater discretion in using the firm’s resources: higher free cash 
flows, higher operating profits, larger cash balances, and less transparent disclosure. In an 
unexpected liquidity shock, a family interested in preserving its empire will divert resources to 
accomplish this. Family firms that enter the crisis with greater internal resources at their disposal 
(or with greater discretion on how they use their resources) will thus be discounted more by 
minority shareholders.  
We find that the underperformance of family-controlled firms is concentrated in only 
those family firms that enter the crisis with high expected agency costs. These firms 
underperform other firms during the crisis by 2.0 to 3.3 percentage points, depending on the 
agency cost proxy. Our earlier results show family control being used to preserve family funds by 
cutting investment, whereas these results indicate that investors also expect other forms of 
diverting  firm resources for the family’s benefit to take place.2 Importantly, family firms with 
                                                
3 Law and finance research shows that the agency conflicts that shape the relation between firm value and ownership 
are likely to depend on countries’ institutional structures (La Porta et al. 1998) and are more likely to be a first-order 
effect in samples of non-U.S. firms (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 1999; Claessens, Djankov, and Lang 
2000). 
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low expected agency costs do not on average underperform relative to other firms.  We also test 
whether the family control discount is concentrated in countries with low levels of shareholder 
protection or transparency and do not find this to be the case. Thus, the family discount appears 
to be a global effect. Overall, these tests indicate that the private-benefits-of-control hypothesis 
explains the underperformance of family-controlled firms during the crisis.  
We consider several alternative hypotheses for the underperformance of family-controlled 
firms, each of which could potentially weaken our conclusion that private benefits play an 
important role. First, Sraer and Thesmar (2007), Bach and Serrano-Velarde (2009), and Mueller 
and Philippon (2011) argue that families are unique in maintaining valuable implicit contracts 
with stakeholders, particularly their employees. These implicit contracts may be costly to 
maintain following a financial shock and might contribute to the family firm discount. However, 
we find no support for this implicit-contract explanation, as family-controlled firms engage in 
significant layoffs and labor cost reductions just as other firms do. 
A second alternative is that family-controlled firms may be fundamentally different from 
other firms, and such differences could make family firms more susceptible to suffering from a 
financial shock.  Consistent with the first part of this statement, we find that family firms are 
different in some characteristics, such as being smaller on average. We thus use several methods 
to test whether underperformance may result from family-controlled firms entering the crisis with 
different characteristics other than being controlled by a family. For instance, we use propensity 
score matching to generate samples of firms not controlled by families that are indistinguishable 
on observable characteristics from family-controlled firms. In all of these tests, we continue to 
find that family-controlled firms significantly underperform their peers during the crisis.   
A final alternative explanation we explore is whether the underperformance of family-
controlled firms stems from our specific variable definitions. We show that our results remain 
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unchanged for crisis windows that are shorter, longer, or have country-specific duration, for 
various definitions of what constitutes a family-controlled firm, and when we risk adjust 
performance using a range of single- and multifactor asset pricing models.  
Our results make several contributions to the literature. To our knowledge, we are the first 
to document that private benefits of family control become more costly to outside investors 
during a financial shock and that the underperformance of family firms is a global effect, 
consistently distributed around the world. We also show that this result obtains only for family 
firms with high expected agency costs. Prior research by Lemmon and Lins (2003) has shown a 
similar effect for managerial (but not family) control and has done so only in East Asian 
emerging markets. Our results coincide with the argument and results of Villalonga and Amit 
(2006) that the family—as a homogeneous group of individuals who know each other well and 
share the same values—can easily coordinate against the interests of minority shareholders.  
Second, our study contributes to the analysis of the real effects of the 2008–2009 financial 
crisis around the world. Several papers have documented a reduction in investment for U.S. firms 
during the crisis (Campello, Graham, and Harvey 2010; Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy 2010; 
Ivashina and Scharfstein 2010; Kuppuswamy and Villalonga 2010). Campello et al. (2012) 
extend this result to European firms. We show that around the world family-controlled firms 
reduce investment more than other firms during the crisis, these investment cuts correspond to 
lower firm performance, and families that control multiple firms cut investment in relatively 
healthy group firms when another group firm becomes severely distressed. Our results 
complement Masulis, Pham, and Zein’s (2011) finding that during the (normal business 
conditions) time period of 2002–2006 family-controlled firms invest more, using the resources of 
the family group to accomplish this. We find that in the recent crisis period any such financing 
advantage did not carry over. Our results are also consistent with Faccio, Marchica, and Mura’s 
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(2011) result showing that firms controlled by undiversified shareholders undertake less risky 
investments than firms controlled by diversified shareholders. Families are typically less 
diversified than other types of shareholders, and our paper shows that they act more 
conservatively during the crisis, likely due to concerns about the survival of the family network.   
Finally, our research focus is deliberately on the impact of family control during a 
financial shock, and using the crisis as a natural experiment allows us to sidestep typical 
endogeneity concerns that make it difficult to identify whether blockholder control impacts firm 
value (e.g., Demsetz and Lehn 1985; Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia 1999; Zhou 2001). In our 
setting, the unanticipated and exogenous financial shock abruptly disrupts the equilibrium, while 
blockholder control remains fixed at least in the short term. This allows us to directly observe 
how investors adjust their valuations of firms with different types of blockholders.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1 discusses our data and 
summary statistics. In Section 2, we analyze whether family control impacts crisis period stock 
returns or the corporate actions taken by firms during the crisis. In Section 3, we explore several 
alternative hypotheses for our findings and conduct robustness tests. Section 4 concludes.  
 
1. Sample and Summary Statistics 
We begin our sample construction by matching nonfinancial firms (i.e., SIC codes 6000–6999 are 
excluded) from the Worldscope-Datastream database as of December 2006 with firms from the 
December 2006 Bureau van Dijk Osiris database, a global database of listed firms with detailed 
shareholder structure data. At that time period, there was little if any indication that a global 
financial crisis loomed on the horizon.  We exclude firms with total assets below US$10 million, 
negative book equity, negative assets, negative cash, negative debt, or missing data for the 
variables needed for our baseline empirical specification. Finally, we exclude U.S. firms and all 
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countries with fewer than twenty-five firms.3 Our final sample contains 8,854 firms from thirty-
five countries.  
 
1.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for our main variables. All nonbinary variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. We summarize some of these variables below. 
The median firm in our sample is somewhat small, with total assets of $239 million and a 
market value of equity of $220 million. Firms are not highly levered entering the crisis, with 
median (book) leverage measured as total debt to total assets equal to 17%. Freefloat, the 
percentage of outstanding shares not held by blockholders, for the median firm in our sample is 
57%. We collect this measure independently from Datastream and Osiris. The two measures are 
highly correlated but not identical, presumably because of small measurement differences, and 
we use an average of the two. The majority of firms are contained in MSCI indices, and relatively 
few firms are cross-listed on a U.S. exchange. The median cash-to-assets ratio is 11%, and 
median profitability (EBITDA to total assets) is 6%.  Investment, measured as the ratio of capital 
expenditures to total assets, has a median value of 4%. 
Our main performance measure is crisis period return, which is the buy-and-hold stock 
return of the firm over the crisis period, where the crisis period begins in mid-August 2008 and 
ends in mid-March 2009, the point at which global markets reached their nadir. As shown in 
                                                
3 Law and finance research shows that the agency conflicts that shape the relation between firm value and ownership 
are likely to depend on countries’ institutional structures (La Porta et al. 1998) and are more likely to be a first-order 
effect in samples of non-U.S. firms (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 1999; Claessens, Djankov, and Lang 
2000). 
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Table 1, the buy-and-hold crisis-period return for the median firm in our sample is −41% and is 
still strongly negative (−23%) for the top quartile of performance.4  
 
1.2 Controlling blockholders 
When studying the impact of families on firm performance around the world, it is well 
established that this relation depends on control, rather than on shareholder concentration, as 
control is enhanced with mechanisms such as dual class shares and pyramids, which form wedges 
between cash flow and voting rights, particularly in less developed financial markets and in 
countries with weaker investor protection (Zingales 1994; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer 1999; Claessens et al. 2002; Faccio and Lang 2002; Volpin 2002; Lins 2003). Data 
requirements for a meaningful analysis of the effects of blockholder control are high, and 
availability of such data across countries has in the past been quite limited. With the Osiris 
database we are able to use a set of detailed firm ownership links that allow us to determine 
ownership structures with a high degree of precision and to trace shareholdings of blockholders 
across countries. Importantly, it allows us to separate different types of controlling blockholders 
using a procedure described below.  
Key to our analysis is the identification of whether a firm has an ultimate controlling 
blockholder and, if so, whether the blockholder is a family.  In the simplest cases, the ultimate 
owner has a direct stake in the firm under investigation, and Osiris data on direct shareholdings 
are enough to identify this blockholder. In more complex cases, however, the ultimate owner has 
an indirect stake in the firm under investigation, and thus identification of the ultimate owner 
requires tracing controlling stakes through potentially many layers between the firm and its 
                                                
4 In robustness tests in Section 2.2, we alternatively consider both shorter and longer fixed-length event windows as 
well as country-specific event windows. 
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ultimate owner. We utilize a unique feature of the data—the provision of shareholding links for 
every firm—to trace ultimate controlling blockholders for the firms in our sample.5  
The Osiris database assigns identifiers to firms and shareholders, where shareholders can 
be virtually any type of legal person. The database identifies ownership by limited and unlimited 
liability firms, public and private firms, cooperatives, foundations, individuals and families, and 
municipalities and states.  The construction of these ownership links is typically complex and is 
explained in a detailed technical document. To conserve space, we limit our discussion to two 
aspects: (1) the way control is traced and (2) how we identify whether a firm has a family as the 
ultimate controlling blockholder. 
Osiris traces control by calculating voting rights, but not cash flow rights, and identifies 
an ultimate owner of a firm if the entity controls the firm directly at a defined threshold or via a 
control chain whose links all exceed that threshold. The threshold in the December 2006 version 
of Osiris can be configured to be 25% or 50%, and we set it to 25%.6 
Using the 25% threshold, we separate firms into the following three categories: (1) widely 
held; (2) ultimately controlled by a family; and (3) ultimately controlled by a nonfamily entity. A 
widely held firm is a company that is known by Osiris to have no ultimate owner at the 25% 
threshold of control. A firm that is ultimately controlled by a family is one in which Osiris traces 
ultimate ownership such that the stake of the family in aggregate exceeds the 25% threshold. 
Note that in compiling the data Osiris keeps track of multiple family members and differences in 
                                                
5 According to Bureau van Dijk, the shareholding links contained in their database have been built up over several 
years, relying on a large number of public and semipublic sources, and at the time of our study it contained 6.69 
million such links. Bureau van Dijk maintains the link database dynamically, updating it with new information when 
it becomes available. Therefore, the database represents snapshots of the international web of shareholder structures 
at relatively precise points in time. 
6 Blockholder definition thresholds vary in the literature, and our more restrictive approach classifies relatively more 
firms as widely held. Some prior studies focusing on family control use slightly lower thresholds (e.g., 20% in 
Faccio and Lang (2002) or no threshold but restrict family definitions to founding families (e.g., Anderson and Reeb 
(2003); Villalonga and Amit (2006)). In robustness tests, which we describe later, we lower the threshold for family 
control and find our results to be unaffected. 
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last names. A non-family-controlled firm is one in which Osiris either identifies an ultimate 
owner at the 25% threshold that is not affiliated with a family, such as firms that are themselves 
widely held, state owners, non-family-controlled foundations, and so forth or one that is known to 
have multiple blockholders that collectively exceed the 25% threshold (so the firm is not widely 
held) but individually do not control the firm at the 25% threshold. We drop from the sample 685 
firms, which are known by Osiris to not be widely held but for which ultimate control is not 
identified. In a robustness test later on, we assume these firms are family controlled, add them to 
our sample, and our results are unchanged.  
Table 2 shows that the median firm in our sample is widely held, as 64% of firms have no 
ultimate controlling blockholder. Eleven percent of firms are family controlled, and 25% are 
nonfamily controlled. The table also shows significant variation in control structures across 
countries prior to the crisis. Among the larger economies, firms are most likely to be widely held 
in Japan, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and Australia, whereas family blockholders are most 
common in France, Italy, Germany, Hong Kong, and South Korea.  
 
2. Crisis-Period Performance and Determinants 
In this section, we analyze the impact of control on crisis period stock returns and find that 
family-controlled firms underperform relative to other firms during the financial crisis. We then 
investigate what might account for this family-firm underperformance, focusing in particular on 
our hypothesis that the extraction of private benefits of control becomes more costly to outside 
investors during a financial shock because the survival of the family’s economic interests 
becomes a key factor driving the use of firm resources. In Section 3, we explore whether 
alternative hypotheses other than private benefits of control might explain family firm 
performance and also perform several robustness tests. 
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2.1 Baseline results   
We begin our empirical tests by examining the determinants of crisis period returns using the 
following baseline specification: 
 
, 1, 2 2,
,
crisis i i i SIC Market i
Ret Block Xα β γ λ λ ε′ ′= + × + × + + +  (1) 
where 
.crisis i
Ret  is the buy-and-hold crisis period return for stock i as described previously, Block 
is a vector of indicator variables which characterize the control structure of a firm, Xi refers to a 
set of firm-specific control variables, which include the firm’s size as measured by the (log of) 
market capitalization, leverage, short term borrowing, beta, momentum, liquidity, MSCI 
inclusion, freefloat, cross-listing, cash holdings, and book-to-market, all of which are described in 
Section 1, and λ1,SIC2 and λ2,Market are two-digit SIC code and country fixed effects, respectively. 
In all regressions, we follow Petersen (2009) and cluster standard errors by country, as our firm-
level variables, including crisis period returns, are likely to be correlated between firms within a 
country.7 
The regression results for our baseline empirical specification (1) are reported in Table 3. 
In Column 1, we conduct an initial test that uses an indicator variable for whether (1) or not (0) 
there is a controlling blockholder of any type. Using this coarse measure of control, we find that 
firms controlled by any type of blockholder performed marginally better during the crisis 
compared with widely held firms. The estimated coefficient is statistically different from zero at 
the 10% level. Coefficients on the control variables used in our regressions show that firms 
                                                
7 An alternative clustering method is to cluster by country-industry, which assumes no correlation between firms in 
different industries in the same country. Because of the comprehensive nature of the financial crisis, we believe that 
such correlations are likely to exist and, if true, country-industry clustering will produce standard errors that are too 
low, even if this effect is mitigated by our inclusion of country fixed effects. When we re-estimate our regressions 
and cluster standard errors by country-industry, rather than by country, standard errors of our point estimates 
typically decline. To be conservative, we report all of our results with country clustering.   
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tended to perform better during the crisis if they were larger, had stronger momentum, lower 
systematic risk, lower leverage, and were not part of an MSCI index.8 
In Column 2, we directly assess our predictions regarding family control, in which we 
include two indicator variables to distinguish between blockholder types: firms with a family as 
the controlling blockholder and what we term as non-family-controlled firms, which are those 
firms that do not have a family as the controlling blockholder but instead are either controlled by 
a single nonfamily blockholder or are controlled by multiple blockholders. We find that family-
controlled firms perform worse than widely held firms during the crisis, whereas non-family-
controlled firms perform better than widely held firms. The differences are statistically significant 
at the 5% significance level or better. In terms of economic significance, family-controlled firms 
have crisis period returns that are 1.7 percentage points lower than widely held firms, whereas 
non-family-controlled firms have returns that are 2.3 percentage points higher than widely held 
firms.  This regression model thus shows that family control negatively impacts outside 
shareholders around the world during a major financial shock, a finding that is new to the 
literature.9  
Given these new results, we next explore whether a possible cause of the family firm 
underperformance is investors’ heightened concern about the controlling family’s conflict of 
                                                
8 We also estimate our models using the log of a firm’s total assets as a size control and all of our results hold (not 
tabulated for the sake of brevity). We prefer the market value of equity as a size control because our dependent 
variable is directly tied to it. Additionally, because family-controlled firms are smaller, they might have higher 
operating leverage, which could affect crisis period performance.  As such, we estimate models that include either 
the change in operating income divided by the change in sales or the change in EBIT divided by the change in sales, 
each averaged over the period 2000–2006, as additional controls. Operating leverage is never significant in the 
regressions, however, and also is not significantly correlated with family control. 
9 Lemmon and Lins (2003) study eight East Asian emerging market countries and find that high managerial control 
is associated with lower stock returns during the region’s 1997 financial crisis. Our results during the unexpected 
“event” of the financial crisis are consistent with a number of other papers whose analyses indicate that families’ 
interests are not always aligned with those of minority shareholders (see, e.g., La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, and 
Shleifer 1999; Claessens et al. 2002; Faccio and Lang 2002; Volpin 2002; Lins 2003; Durnev and Kim 2005; 
Bennedsen et al. 2007; Bertrand et al. 2008; Almeida et al. 2011; Ellul, Pagano, and Panunzi 2010; Masulis, Pham, 
and Zein 2001; Franks et al. 2012). 
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interest. We first analyze whether family firms make different financing or investment decisions 
and, if so, whether these decisions matter for performance.  We then analyze whether 
underperformance is concentrated in family firms expected ex ante to have larger agency costs.  
 
 
2.2 Financing and investment decisions 
In Table 4, we assess whether family-controlled firms have different policies regarding cash 
holdings, dividends, leverage, short-term debt, credit lines, equity issues, and capital expenditures 
during the crisis relative to their industry peers. We do so by estimating panel regressions for the 
period 2006 to 2009, with firm fixed effects and industry-year fixed effects as well as control 
variables. Specifically, we estimate the following baseline difference-in-differences specification: 
 ,
it i t it ct i it
Decision Block Crisis Xα φ γ λ λ ε′ ′= + × × + × + + +  (2) 
where 
it
Decision  is a financing decision (in Panel A) or an investment decision (in Panel B) for 
firm i in year t, Blocki is an indicator variable for either family or nonfamily blockholder control, 
Crisist is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for the crisis years 2008 and 2009 and is 
zero for the years 2006 and 2007, Xit refers to a set of firm-specific control variables (which 
include (log of) firm size, leverage, profitability, and Tobin’s Q), λct are industry-year fixed 
effects, and λi are firm fixed effects. Crisist is not included as a stand-alone variable in the model 
because it is subsumed by the industry-year fixed effects. The parameter of interest is φ, which 
captures the change in either financing activity or investment activity during the crisis for firms 
controlled by family or nonfamily blockholders. As before, standard errors are clustered at the 
country level. 
In Panel A, we find that family-controlled firms do not differ in their crisis period 
decisions about cash holdings, dividend policy, leverage, short-term debt, credit lines, or equity 
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issues compared with other firms. These tests showing that family-controlled firms’ financing 
policies are not uniquely different during the crisis indicate that families do not appear to have (or 
choose not to use) any preferential access to finance compared to other types of firms. 
In Panel B, we analyze investment decisions and do find differences. Specifically, family-
controlled firms reduce their investment (measured as capital expenditures to assets) by 0.52 
percentage points relative to other firms. With median capital expenditures to assets of 3.7 
percent for our sample, this is equivalent to a 14% reduction in investment. As argued earlier, 
relative to firms controlled by more diversified shareholders, family-controlled firms may be 
biased toward survival-oriented actions that help preserve the family’s control benefits, both now 
and in the future. Cutting investment preserves resources and lessens the risk that a family will 
lose control of its firm(s). However, Desai, Foley, and Forbes (2008) study a range of prior 
currency crises around the world and find that incremental investment is productive during these 
crises. Thus, it is plausible that a family’s decision to reduce investment during the recent global 
financial crisis goes against the interest of minority shareholders and may at least partially 
account for our family-firm underperformance results. We test this next. 
 
2.3 Investment and performance 
In Table 5, we use a variation of our previous crisis-period return regression model to test 
whether investment cuts made as a result of the crisis can explain the relative underperformance 
of family-controlled firms.   
We compute crisis period investment changes as crisis period investment less precrisis 
period investment, all divided by precrisis period investment. We use two alternative measures.   
For 
1,i
InvΔ , we average investment during the crisis years of 2008 and 2009 to obtain a firm’s 
crisis period investment level and then average investment during the precrisis years of 2006 and 
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2007 to obtain its precrisis investment level. For 
2,i
InvΔ , crisis period investment is just for year 
2009 and precrisis investment is just for year 2006. Based on these two measures of investment 
changes, we construct six indicator variables for investment cuts: two indicators for whether a 
firm’s change in investment was negative, ( )1, 0iI InvΔ <  and ( )2, 0iI InvΔ < ; two indicators for 
whether a firm’s change in investment is smaller than the sample median, ( )1,iI Inv MedianΔ <  
and ( )2,iI Inv MedianΔ < ; and two indicators for whether a firm’s change in investment belongs 
to the lowest quartile, ( )1, 25thiI Inv PctlΔ <  and ( )2, 25thiI Inv PctlΔ < . Consistent with Table 4, 
summary statistics for these investment cut indicators reported in Panel A of Table 5 show that 
family-controlled firms cut investment significantly more during the crisis. Depending on the 
investment cut measure, the proportion of family firms that cut investment is 7.4% to 16.4% 
higher than for nonfamily firms and 8.7% to 14.4% higher than for widely held firms. 
In Panel B, we estimate the correlation between investment cuts and performance using 
the following regression model: 
 
, 1, 2 2,
,
crisis i i i i SIC Market i
Ret Block Cut Xα β γ δ λ λ ε′ ′ ′= + × + + + + +    (3) 
where Cuti is one of the investment cut variables defined above and all other variables are the 
same as in Equation (1). In all models, the coefficient on the investment cut indicator is negative 
and highly significant. Thus, firms experience greater crisis-period performance declines when 
they cut investment more, a result consistent with the idea that during a period of scarce liquidity 
incremental investment has a relatively high expected payoff.  Because family firms were shown 
previously to cut investment more than other firms, the results in Table 5 support the idea that the 
underperformance of family-controlled firms is at least partly related to the decisions by families 
to reduce investment during the crisis. At the bottom of Table 5, we explicitly test this 
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explanation by assessing whether investment cuts have a mediating effect on the relation between 
family control and underperformance.10 We follow the Sobel (1982) framework and implement 
the bootstrapping procedure suggested by Preacher and Hayes (2004). In all six specifications, 
the mediation effect is highly statistically significant and indicates that on average roughly a third 
of the underperformance of family firms is attributable to investment cuts. 
 
 
2.4 Investment and groups 
Having established that investment cuts matter for performance, we next directly test the idea that 
families may cut investment to enhance the survival chances of the firms under their control. 
Specifically, we investigate whether a family group that controls equity in multiple sample firms 
intervenes in capital budgeting decisions to enhance the chance for survival of the family’s entire 
network of firms. In a crisis, expectations of nonsurvival increase.11 If a firm controlled by a 
family is hit hard by the crisis, the family may try to increase the firm’s probability of survival by 
transmitting the liquidity shock across its other group firms by reducing investment in these 
firms. Severe financial distress in one family firm would then be associated with investment cuts 
in other healthier group firms. 
To test this hypothesis, we start by identifying firms that belong to a group of any type, 
family or otherwise. For each sample firm we consider its direct and indirect shareholders and 
cross-reference them with all other Osiris firms and their respective direct and indirect 
                                                
10 We thank Jan Sokolowski for suggesting us this test. 
11 Claessens, Djankov, and Klapper (2003) find that during the 1997 East Asian crisis, 644 of their 1,472 sample 
firms became financially distressed and 83 of these had filed for bankruptcy by the end of 1998, a much higher rate 
of distress and bankruptcy than in normal times. We obtain all bankruptcies and restructurings from SDC for our 
sample countries for the period 2004–2012. After excluding censored, that is, ongoing, events, this yields 2,729 
observations. We find that restructuring and bankruptcy events increase from an average of 0.54 events per month 
per 1,000 listed firms in the period before the crisis (from 2004 to 2007) to an average of 0.94 events per month per 
1,000 listed firms after the crisis (from 2009 to 2012). 
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shareholders. We define a firm as belonging to a group if there is at least one shareholder with a 
direct or indirect stake of at least 25% that the firm shares with another firm or if at least one 
other firm is such a shareholder of this firm. We iterate this procedure across all possible paths 
between firms to identify the boundary of each group. This 25% cutoff approach yields 
conservative estimates of whether firms are members of a group and of group size. By our 
definition, a minimum of two (listed) sample firms must be connected to constitute a group. 
Under this approach, 12.6% of our 8,584 sample firms are members of a group, there are 483 
groups in total, and the median group size is four firms. For the following analysis, we restrict 
our sample to these 1,084 group firms. 
 Panel A of Table 6 reports summary statistics for family- and non-family-controlled 
groups. Consistent with our prior results, within this subsample of group firms, family-controlled 
firms underperform and underinvest compared with non-family-controlled firms. Family groups 
are smaller than non-family groups but have similar geographical diversification, with about half 
of all firms being part of a multinational group.12  
In Panel B, we test whether family groups with one or more firms that experience a large 
shock cut investment more in other firms belonging to their groups. We define firms as 
experiencing a large shock (i.e., being hard hit) if they alternatively belong to the lowest 5th, 
10th, 20th, or 30th percentile of crisis-period stock-price performance of the entire sample of 
8,584 firms. Then we select all firms that belong to a family group with one or more of the hard-
hit firms but are not in the hard-hit category themselves. Depending on the large shock cutoff 
                                                
12 We note here that our Panel A, Table 6, group statistics also indicate that controlling families are indeed relatively 
less diversified in terms of the firm(s) they control compared with nonfamily blockholders. From Table 2, there are 
969 family firms and 2,121 nonfamily firms (11% and 25% of the 8,584 total sample firms, respectively).  Thus, 
Panel A shows that 75% of the occurrences of family control are for a single firm ((969 – 240)/969), whereas only 
60% of the occurrences of nonfamily control are for a single firm ((2,121 – 844)/2,121).  
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used, this identifies 15, 29, 46, or 66 family firms, respectively. These firms represent our 
treatment group, in Column 1.  
We compare investment of the treatment group with four alternative control groups. The 
first, control group 1, is the set of family firms that belongs to groups without any hard-hit firms. 
Control group 1 therefore only differs from the treatment group in not being exposed to a likely 
survival risk. As Column 2 shows, investment cuts are between 4% and 21% larger in the 
treatment than in the control group when we use the lowest fifth and tenth percentile of 
performance as the cutoff for a large shock. The relative investment cuts are of comparable size 
but are no longer significant when we use the two less stringent definitions of a large shock 
(lowest quintile and lowest three deciles of performance).  
The second benchmark, control group 2, is the set of firms that belongs to non-family-
controlled groups without any hard-hit firms. Control group 2 therefore differs from the treatment 
group in not being exposed to a likely survival risk and in being nonfamily controlled. This set of 
firms is much larger and our results, in Column 3, are stronger: Investment cuts in the treatment 
group are between 7% and 29% larger, and the difference is almost always highly significant.  
The third benchmark, control group 3, is the set of firms that belongs to nonfamily 
controlled groups with hard-hit firms. Control group 3 therefore differs from the treatment group 
only in being nonfamily controlled. The results, in Column 4, again confirm our hypothesis: Even 
within hard-hit groups, family firms cut investment by 6% to 29% more than nonfamily firms, 
depending on the specification. We obtain similar findings in Column 5, where we combine 
control groups 1 and 3 to form control group 4.  
These results show that firms in hard-hit family groups cut investment more than firms in 
family groups without any hard-hit members and more than firms in non-family-controlled 
groups that do have hard-hit members. This evidence that severe financial distress in one family 
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group firm is associated with investment cuts in other healthier group firms is consistent with 
ensuring survival of the family empire but is unlikely to be in the best interest of the minority 
shareholders of the healthier group firms. 
 
2.5 Firm-level differences in agency conflicts 
Our results are consistent with market participants recognizing that families have the 
ability to use their control to make discretionary decisions that benefit themselves at the expense 
of outside shareholders during the crisis. So far, our paper has focused on decisions to cut 
investment. To further assess this interpretation of our results, we test whether the 
underperformance of family-controlled firms is more pronounced in firms in which outside 
investors would expect agency costs of control to be particularly high, indicating that other forms 
of diverting a firm’s resources may be taking place. We classify a firm as having high potential 
for agency conflicts if it has above-median free cash flow, measured as the ratio of EBITDA less 
capital expenditures to assets (results are unchanged if we refine this classification to require a 
firm to have both above-median free cash flow and below-median Tobin’s Q), if the firm has 
above median cash to assets, or if it has less transparent disclosure, measured by the use of local 
GAAP accounting standards rather than international standards. Each of these measures is 
consistent with a firm’s managers having greater discretion over the firm’s resources. In an 
unexpected liquidity shock, a family interested in preserving its empire will divert resources to 
accomplish this. Family firms with greater discretion over a firm’s resources will thus be 
discounted by minority shareholders.  
The results of these splits into firms with high and low expected agency costs are reported 
in Table 7. Consistent with the hypothesis that family firms underperform because of agency 
conflicts, we find across all classifications that the underperformance of family-controlled firms 
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is concentrated in only those family firms that enter the crisis with high expected agency costs. 
These firms underperform widely held firms during the crisis by 2.4 to 3.1 percentage points and 
underperform non-family-controlled firms by 4.4 to 4.7 percentage points. Importantly, family 
firms with low ex ante expected agency costs do not underperform relative to widely held firms 
(although they always underperform relative to non-family-controlled firms).  
 
3. Alternative Hypotheses and Robustness 
In this section, we consider several alternative hypotheses for the underperformance of family-
controlled firms, each of which could potentially weaken our conclusion that private benefits play 
an important role. First, family-controlled firms may be fundamentally different from other firms, 
and such differences could make family firms more susceptible to suffering from a financial 
shock. Second, prior research has argued that families are unique in maintaining valuable implicit 
contracts with employees. These implicit contracts may be costly to maintain following a 
financial shock and might contribute to the family firm discount. A final alternative explanation 
that we explore is whether the underperformance of family-controlled firms stems from our 
specific variable definitions. In turn, we examine whether the results are influenced by our 
definition of what constitutes a family-controlled firm and the way we amalgamate nonfamily 
blockholders; we consider alternative lengths of the event window over which crisis period 
returns are calculated; and we risk adjust crisis period returns using seven different domestic and 
international single- and multifactor asset pricing models.  
 
3.1 Precrisis firm characteristics 
If blockholder control type is systematically related to differences in firm characteristics, the 
differential impact of family control may at least partly result from differences in firm 
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characteristics. It is thus crucial to identify whether such differences exist and to properly account 
for them in our analyses.  
 In our previous cross-sectional regressions, we control for variables, such as profitability, 
leverage, liquidity, cash, and size, to separate the effects of a firm’s financial characteristics from 
the effect of control structures during a crisis. Doing so is not sufficient, however, if control 
structures and financial characteristics of a firm are interdependent. For example, if family firms 
have lower leverage, as found by Villalonga and Amit (2006), or larger cash holdings, as found 
by Kalcheva and Lins (2007), then they might fare better in a financial shock.  
In Panel A of Table 8, we compare precrisis characteristics of family firms and other 
firms. As of December 2006, family-controlled firms are significantly smaller, less risky, and less 
likely to be on an MSCI index or be cross-listed than either non-family-controlled or widely held 
firms. They are also more levered, have higher momentum, and lower freefloat than widely held 
firms and have higher cash and book-to-market ratios than non-family-controlled firms.  
To assess whether these pre-crisis differences between family and other firms influence 
our results, we conduct a matched sample analysis using propensity score matching algorithms 
following Dehejia and Wahba (2002). The first stage of estimating propensity scores in probit 
models is shown in Panel B. The binary dependent variable is whether (1) or not (0) a firm is 
family controlled, and the explanatory variables are as in Table 3. In both regressions the 
treatment group is the sample of firms that are family controlled. In the first regression, the 
control group is the sample of firms that are widely held; in the second regression, it is the sample 
of firms that are non-family-controlled.  
In Panel C, we use the first-stage propensity estimates to match each family-controlled 
firm with a set of control firms that have similar characteristics to the family firm (i.e., their 
estimated propensity scores are similar to the family firm), but they are either widely held firms 
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or non-family-controlled firms. The selection of control firms requires decisions on closeness-of-
match and total sample size of control firms that are selected. A lower tolerance level on the 
maximum propensity score distance (caliper) lessens the risk of bad matches.  The number of 
control firms varies based on whether just one nearest neighbor is chosen or a radius match is 
used in which all control firms that fit within the caliper are selected. In our analysis, control 
firms are selected four ways: (1) with replacement using all matching firms within the predefined 
propensity score distance (caliper) δ = 0.0001;  (2) with replacement using all matching firms 
within the caliper δ = 0.001; (3) using the control firm with the closest propensity score (nearest 
neighbor), with resampling and distance restrictions (control firms can be drawn a maximum of 
three times, nearest neighbor distance cannot exceed δ = 0.02); and (4) using the nearest 
neighbor, without resampling or distance restrictions. Once the control groups are selected, we 
then compare crisis period returns for the treatment group with each matched control group.  
The results in Panel C show that no matter how control groups are selected, family firms 
significantly underperform other firms during the crisis: Their underperformance ranges from 2.7 
to 5.4 percentage points relative to widely held firms and from 2.3 to 4.4 percentage points 
relative to non-family-controlled firms. Thus, even when other firms are matched to be 
indistinguishable from family-controlled firms, family-controlled firms underperform. These 
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findings confirm the results in Table 3 and alleviate the concern that precrisis differences in firm 
characteristics may be the source of the underperformance of family-controlled firms.13   
 
3.2 Implicit contracts, layoffs, and labor costs 
We next investigate whether the honoring of implicit contracts to employees might account for 
our family firm underperformance. The idea here is that family firms can better commit to honor 
long-term implicit contracts because the family reputation is at stake and/or the family’s grip on 
control prevents hostile takeovers. Sraer and Thesmar (2007) show that employment is less 
sensitive to sales shocks in heir-managed French firms; Bach and Serrano-Velarde (2009) find 
that family-promoted CEOs are associated with lower job turnover and less wage renegotiation; 
and Mueller and Philippon (2011) document greater family ownership in countries in which labor 
relations are hostile, concluding that family firms are particularly effective at coping with 
difficult labor relations. 
This view of family control suggests an alternative explanation for the finding that family 
firms are associated with weaker stock market performance during the crisis than firms with other 
control structures: Family firms are committed to maintaining implicit contracts with employees. 
In other words, the poor stock price performance comes at the benefit of protecting employment. 
                                                
13 Another possible explanation for the underperformance of family-controlled firms is survivorship bias. We require 
market return availability throughout the crisis period and exclude firms that do not survive. If family firms are more 
likely to survive, our finding that family firms underperform may be due to their poor, but not catastrophic, 
performance being captured in our sample, whereas other firms’ catastrophic performance is not captured because 
they do not survive. To analyze whether nonsurvival is related to blockholder type, we identify all firms that do not 
survive as listed firms from August 2008 to December 2009 (74 firms) and estimate the determinants of nonsurvival 
for this sample, using both Cox hazard rate and logit regression models. In both the hazard rate and logit models (not 
tabulated for the sake of brevity), we find that nonsurvivors have higher leverage, lower momentum, lower liquidity, 
and are not part of an MSCI index. The type of controlling blockholder, however, does not affect survival. Because 
family firms are not more likely to survive than other firms, survival bias is unlikely to account for our results. 
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If true, then during the crisis one should observe fewer cuts to either number of employees or 
labor costs in family-controlled firms than in other firms.  
Table 9 tests this hypothesis that family firms do less restructuring of their labor forces 
during the crisis. As before, we use a difference-in-differences approach with yearly panel data 
from 2006 to 2009. Specifically, we estimate the following specification: 
                       ,
it i t it ct i it
Restructure Block Crisis Xα φ γ λ λ ε′ ′= + × × + × + + +  (4) 
where 
it
Restructure  is either the reduction in the number of employees (which we term “layoffs”) 
or the reduction in labor costs for firm i in year t, whereas Blocki, Crisist, and all control variables 
and fixed effects are as in specification (2), and standard errors are clustered at the country level. 
The parameter of interest is φ, which captures the change in restructuring activity for different 
types of controlling blockholders during the crisis. 
The results in Table 9 are inconsistent with the view that family firms underperform 
because they maintain implicit employee contracts: During the crisis, family firms are equally 
likely to lay off employees and to reduce labor costs relative all other firms.14 Rather, these 
results are consistent with family firms being exposed to a lack of liquidity during the crisis and 
thus being unable to shield their employees from unemployment risk.  
 
3.3 Alternative blockholder definitions  
To explore whether our definition of family control matters for our results, in Table 10 we 
consider several refinements of our blockholder classification method. We collect data on all 
                                                
14 Because non-family and widely held firms increase investment relative to family firms in the crisis, our finding 
that family firms do not reduce labor costs more indicates they may be less productive in terms of their labor to 
capital ratios. We also note that if we cluster standard errors in the less conservative manner at the country-industry 
level, the negative coefficient of (Family control) × (Crisis period) in Column 1 becomes significant at the 5% level.  
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board members of all sample firms (70,000 individuals), together with their direct and indirect 
shareholdings, and construct three adjustments to the definition of family control.  
To facilitate comparison, we report in Column 1 of Panel A the base-case regression 
specification estimated in Table 3. In Column 2, we expand the family firm definition to also 
include firms in which one or more board members controls at least 25% of voting rights 
(Family-controlled alternative 1). This reclassifies 122 firms as family-controlled. The result is 
virtually identical to our baseline result reproduced in Column 1: Family firms again perform 
worse during the crisis relative to widely held firms (1.8 percentage points lower stock returns), 
whereas non-family-controlled firms continue to perform better than widely held firms (2.3 
percentage points higher returns). In Columns 3 and 4, we allow family control to also include 
firms in which one or more board members control at least 20% of voting rights (Family-
controlled alternative 2, reclassifies 102 firms) and 10% of voting rights (Family-controlled 
alternative 3, reclassifies 107 firms), respectively, and find that our results remain virtually 
unchanged.  Thus, our Panel A models show that our general result that family firms 
underperform other firms during the crisis holds for many plausible definitions of family control.  
Next, in Panel B of Table 10 we break down the category of nonfamily controlling 
blockholder into the most detailed subcategories we have available. Sorted in order of decreasing 
prevalence, nonfamily controlling blockholders are (1) a nonfinancial firm (74.2% of all cases), 
(2) a financial investor that is neither a bank nor an insurance company (15.9%), (3) a state 
(5.8%), (4) a bank (3.5%), or (5) an insurance company (0.6% of all cases). For reference, the 
baseline regression with the pooled nonfamily controlling blockholder dummy (from Table 3) is 
reported in Column 1. We then replace the pooled dummy with dummy variables for all five 
subcategories in Column 2. We find evidence of outperformance by all five subcategories of 
nonfamily blockholders, although it is not always significantly different from zero (which may 
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stem from low power tests in subcategories with few observations). Collectively, the evidence 
suggests that any type of blockholder, except a family, is beneficial during a liquidity shock. 15    
 Finally, for additional robustness, instead of dropping the 685 firms that have no available 
information on their control structure, expect for the fact that they are not widely held, we assume 
that these firms are controlled by a family and rerun our tests. The results (not reported) are 
virtually identical to those in Table 3, indicating that firms with unknown control perform very 
similar to firms known to be family-controlled.  Because we cannot directly observe their control 
situation, we continue to exclude these firms from our analysis. 
 
3.4 Alternative event windows 
Next, in Table 11, we consider several alternative event windows. In Columns 1 to 4, crisis 
period returns are calculated over 3, 5, 7 (our baseline), and 9 months.  
In the table, we estimate specification (1) using the returns on the three alternative event 
windows as dependent variables, while keeping everything else as in Table 3. In Columns 2 and 
4, we obtain results that are very similar to the ones in the baseline analysis reported in Table 3: 
When we distinguish across different blockholder types, we find that family-controlled firms 
underperform widely held firms by 1.6 percentage points, whereas nonfamily blockholder firms 
outperform widely held firms by 1.8 and 2.2 percentage points. The results in Column (1) for the 
three-month period are statistically weaker and roughly half as large, suggesting that the impact 
                                                
15 In addition to potential access-to-finance benefits assessed in Wruck (1989), Hertzel and Smith (1993), Winton 
(1993), and Weinstein and Yafeh (1998), blockholders have been argued to help in product markets (Khanna and 
Palepu 1997, 2000) and to provide monitoring (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 1986; Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi 1997; 
Maug 1998).  In unreported regressions, we distinguish between firms with a single nonfamily blockholder and firms 
with multiple blockholders. Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) show how having several large blockholders forces 
them to form coalitions to exercise control, which can result in more efficient actions, and Laeven and Levine (2008) 
find that firms with multiple large blockholders have different valuations than other firms. We find that both single 
and multiple nonfamily blockholders are associated with higher crisis period returns, and there is no significant 
difference between their coefficients. We note here that we are not aware of any crisis-specific empirical nonfamily 
blockholder research. 
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of blockholder control on equity market value following the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy was 
not immediate.  
Results become more pronounced when we take into account that the speed of the impact 
of the financial crisis differed between countries. We do this in Columns 5 and 6, where the 
length of the time window over which crisis period returns are calculated is determined 
separately for each country, using two different measures. In both measures, crisis period returns 
begin in the middle of August 2008. For the first measure, in Column 5, the country-specific 
crisis period ends in the month prior to the country’s first positive monthly return, that is, 
excluding the uptick month itself. For the second measure, in Column 6, the crisis period ends in 
the month prior to the country’s first three positive uptick months, representing a more 
pessimistic estimate of the length of the financial crisis. 
The argument in favor of choosing country-specific crisis periods is that, as recent papers, 
such as Beber and Pagano (2013), have shown, the financial crisis impacted markets differently. 
Figure 1 shows the wide variation across countries, regarding both the magnitude and the timing 
of the impact. By using a fixed-length window across all countries, independent of whether prices 
are still falling in that particular market, our results may be biased against detecting any abnormal 
performance due to controlling blockholders. At the same time, an argument against choosing 
variable-length event windows is the potential endogeneity concern that market returns 
themselves are used to determine the period over which firms’ equity market returns are 
measured.  
The length of the post-Lehman-Brothers-bankruptcy downturn varies, with the median 
country in our sample experiencing six months of consistently negative returns. The shortest 
market downturns are concentrated in emerging markets, with two 
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South Korea) and three months (Chile and Portugal) of consecutive negative returns, whereas 
most developed markets experienced downturns of six months.16 
The results in Columns 5 and 6 using these country-specific crisis period returns as the 
dependent variable are again very similar to the ones in the baseline analysis reported in Table 3: 
When we distinguish across different blockholder types, we find that family-controlled firms 
underperform 1.6 to 2.0 percentage points relative to widely held firms, whereas nonfamily 
blockholders outperform widely held firms by 2.3 to 2.7 percentage points.  
To summarize, in these robustness tests the coefficient on family blockholders is always 
negative and significant, whereas the coefficient for nonfamily blockholders is always positive 
and significant. Overall, the length of the event window does not greatly affect results.  
 
3.5 Alternative return measures: Adjusting for risk 
In our baseline regressions in Table 3 we control for, among other factors, size, book-to-market, 
momentum, and systematic risk. The cross-sectional regression does not, however, accommodate 
firm-specific factor loadings for these potential risk factors. To further assess robustness, we use 
risk-adjusted excess returns as the dependent variable. Because the literature has not converged 
on one commonly accepted multicountry asset pricing model, we employ seven alternative 
single- and multifactor models as follows:  DOM is a single-factor domestic market model, which 
uses a value-weighted domestic market factor, MKT, for each country; GLOBAL is equivalent 
but uses a value-weighted global market factor instead; HKK3 DOM and HKK3 INT are 
domestic and international versions of the Hou, Karolyi, and Kho (2011) model, which use 
                                                
16 We arbitrarily set the length of the downturn to the sample median for Greece as its market did not experience any 
positive return between September 2008 and December 2010. 
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factor-mimicking portfolios to construct a valuation factor,17 a momentum (MOM) factor and a 
MKT factor; FF4 DOM and FF4 INT are domestic and international versions of the four-factor  
Carhart (1997) model that includes the factors MKT, size (SML), book-to-market (HML) and 
MOM; and FF8 DI includes both the domestic and international version of the four Carhart 
factors under the premise that stock prices during the crisis can be affected incrementally by both 
domestic and international factors.  
Domestic factors are country specific as mentioned, whereas international factors are 
calculated for each country as the weighted average of the respective domestic factors of all other 
countries, where weights are the relative stock market capitalization of each country. See Hau 
and Lai (2011) for construction details of the individual factor portfolios. Data for domestic and 
international market factors (MKT), small-to-large factors (SML), book-to-market factors 
(HML), and momentum factors (MOM) are kindly provided by the respective authors. 
Across all models, in the first step we estimate individual stock loadings of the factor-
mimicking portfolios using regressions over the sixty-month period preceding the crisis, August 
2003–July 2008, with a minimum of thirty months of data (with this restriction, we lose 60 out of 
the total 8,584 sample firms). To illustrate, for the seventh model, FF8 DI, we estimate  
, 1, , , 2, , , 3, , , 4, , , ,
,
,
i t i i j t j i j t j i j t j i j t j i t
j Dom Int
R MKT SML HML MOMα β β β β ε
=
 = + + + + + ∑  (3) 
where Ri,t indicates a firm’s excess return (net of the risk-free rate), and j indicates the domestic 
and international set of factors, respectively. Summary statistics for the estimated factor loadings 
for all models are reported in Panel A of Table 12.   
                                                
17 Because of data availability, our valuation factor is the Fama-French HML factor portfolio instead of the, 
according to the authors more suitable, cash flow to price factor portfolio. Also, we use a twelve-month momentum 
factor instead of their six-month factor. 
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In the second step, we use the factor loadings estimated precrisis and calculate the 
monthly risk-adjusted excess return during the August 2008 to March 2009 crisis period. To 
illustrate, for the seventh model, FF8 DI, we calculate  
. , 1, , , 2, , , 3, , , 4, , , ,
,
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ,
ex
i t i t i j t j i j t j i j t j i j t j i t
j Dom Int
R R MKT SML HML MOMβ β β β ε
=
 = − + + + + ∑   (4) 
We then compound 
.
ex
i t
R  to obtain a firm’s buy-and-hold excess return during the crisis period as  
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i
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= 1+ R
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∏ .      (5) 
We use these Equation (5) excess returns as the dependent variable to estimate the same 
specification as in Table 3. The results are reported in Panel B of Table 12. The findings change 
very little compared with our prior analysis. Family-controlled firms still significantly 
underperform widely held firms and non-family-controlled firms. Non-family-controlled firms 
continue to perform better than widely held firms, although, in the multifactor models, the 
difference is not statistically significant. Relative to our baseline results in Table 3, where the 
models explain about a third of the total variation in crisis period returns, R2 values in Table 12 
decline dramatically (likely because many of the firm-specific variables that explain performance 
during the crisis are at least somewhat correlated with the factor portfolios).  Collectively, we 
conclude from these tests that our family-firm underperformance results are robust to measuring 
performance using risk-adjusted techniques. 
 
3.6 Cross-country tests 
Finally, we consider whether country-level measures of shareholder protection add explanatory 
power to our findings that minority shareholders are concerned with the incremental costs and 
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benefits of controlling blockholders during a financial shock. The law and finance literature has 
often argued that firm-level governance issues are more pronounced when institutions that protect 
outside shareholders are relatively weak (see, e.g., La Porta et al. 2002; Durnev and Kim 2005; 
Doidge et al. 2009; Leuz, Lins, and Warnock 2009). As mentioned, prior work regarding 
blockholder control and crisis period valuation finds that firms with a high level of managerial 
control are associated with lower valuations, but the sample contains only eight emerging market 
countries (Lemmon and Lins 2003).  
 As a first test, we split the sample into emerging and developed markets based on the 
2006 classification of The Economist and re-estimate our Table 3 models. The results 
(untabulated for the sake of brevity) show that the negative coefficient of family control is larger 
in emerging markets than for the full sample, while there is no significant negative effect of 
family control in developed markets. We also find that the beneficial effect of nonfamily 
blockholders is present in both the emerging and developed market subsamples. Thus, minority 
shareholders appear to discount family-controlled firms more heavily when they are likely to be 
least protected, to the extent that in 2006 an emerging market classification corresponds to lower 
shareholder protection. 
 We take this analysis further and split our sample by country-level measures that 
explicitly assess shareholder protection, such as indices for antidirector rights (La Porta et al. 
1998; Spamann 2010) and anti-self-dealing (Djankov et al. 2008), rule of law and legal origin (La 
Porta et al. 1998), and several securities law indicators from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (2006). In these splits, we find no consistent evidence that family control has a uniquely 
different impact on valuation when minority shareholder protection is lower. Next, despite small 
sample sizes in many cases, we estimate individual country regressions and generally find 
negative coefficients for family control (as would be expected) but note that family control 
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coefficients are positive and marginally significant for two countries (Belgium and Brazil) and 
are positive but insignificant for thirteen countries (Austria, Canada, Finland, Indonesia, Israel, 
Italy, Japan, Norway, Philippines, Sweden, South Africa, South Korea, and Taiwan).18 Thus, 
although we cannot say that costs of family control outweigh the benefits in each of our sample 
countries, we do conclude that family control is costly to minority shareholders around the world 
on average during a financial crisis. 
 
4. Conclusion 
A large number of publicly traded firms around the world are controlled by families. Whether 
and how family control can influence firm value has been studied extensively, yet the literature 
has not produced a conclusive answer. This paper provides new evidence on the value of family 
control around the world by studying its effect during the 2008–2009 financial crisis. 
The unexpected liquidity shock from the financial crisis changes the benefits and costs of 
family control for minority shareholders.  For instance, a controlling family may be beneficial to 
the extent that it provides greater access to finance via other firms under its control.  On the other 
hand, protection of a family’s private benefits of control may become a greater priority during a 
liquidity shock. Controlling families tend to have their wealth tied up in the firm(s) they control.  
Thus, relative to firms controlled by more diversified shareholders, family-controlled firms may 
take survival-oriented actions that preserve the family’s control benefits even if these actions are 
not in the interests of minority shareholders. 
                                                
18 For some countries, mixed prior evidence exists. For example, in the case of South Korea, Baek, Kang, and Park 
(2004) find that family control was costly during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, whereas Almeida and Kim (2012) 
find that being part of a chaebol business group, which significantly overlaps with family control, was on net 
beneficial. Also, the recent crisis was truly global, and was arguably more pronounced economically in countries 
typically viewed as having better governance, and less pronounced in countries with weaker governance. This would 
make it difficult to detect incremental underperformance of family firms in weaker governance countries, should 
such underperformance exist. 
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Across a large sample of firms from thirty-five countries, we find that family-controlled 
firms underperform relative to other firms during the global financial crisis, controlling for firm, 
industry, and country characteristics. The underperformance is robust to many different model 
specifications and to matched-sample analysis. When we explore the corporate actions that 
explain this performance differential, we find no evidence that financing choices play a role as 
there are no significant differences in terms of cash holdings, dividend policy, leverage, debt 
maturity, credit lines, and equity issues between family firms and other firms.  
We next explore real-side decisions taken during the crisis and find that family-controlled 
firms reduce their investment relative to other firms. We also find that these investment changes 
affect performance, as firms that cut investment more suffer greater stock price declines during 
the crisis. In further tests, we show that when a family controls multiple firms in a group and one 
of the firms in the family group is hit strongly by the crisis, the family reduces investment in the 
other relatively healthy group firms.  
Taken together, our evidence points toward a conflict-of-interest explanation for the 
underperformance of family-controlled firms during the crisis. Families become increasingly 
interested in preserving their control rights. Thus, they take actions geared toward enhancing the 
survival of the firm(s) under their control. Outside shareholders anticipate these shifting 
incentives on the part of family blockholders and mark down share prices accordingly.  
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Figure 1. Stock Market Returns During the 2008-2009 Financial Crisis Around The World  
Monthly stock market returns (value-weighted) for all 35 sample countries. Returns are buy-and-hold returns 
calculated using all sample firms and begin August 2008. The vertical line indicates March 2009, the MSCI World 
Total Return Index’ lowest point during the crisis.  
41 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics  
Summary statistics for the main variables used in subsequent regression analyses. Total assets and market 
capitalization are in millions of US dollars; Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets; Short-term debt is the 
ratio of short-term debt to total debt; Beta is the correlation between the stock return and the local market return 
estimated over the previous year; Momentum is a firm’s stock return over the year preceding August 2008; Liquidity 
is the percentage of days during which the stock return was different from zero in the one-year period preceding 
August 2008; Freefloat is defined as 100 minus the percentage of shares closely held; MSCI is an indicator variable 
for whether (1) or not (0) a firm’s stock belongs to an MSCI index; Cross-listing is an indicator variable for whether 
(1) or not (0) a firm has a U.S. exchange-listed ADR as of December 2006; Cash holdings is the ratio of cash to total 
assets; Book-to-market is the ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of equity; Profitability is operating 
profit (measured as EBITDA) divided by total assets; Investment is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets; 
and Crisis period return is the buy-and-hold stock return of a firm from the middle of August 2008 to the middle of 
March 2009. All firm-level statistics other than beta, momentum, liquidity, and crisis period return are as of 
December 2006. All nonbinary variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
 
Variable N Mean 25th pctl. Median 75th pctl. SD 
        
Total assets 8,584 1,492 71 239 876 3,977 
Market capitalization 8,584 1,328 60 220 842 3,212 
Leverage 8,584 0.20 0.03 0.17 0.32 0.17 
Short term debt 8,584 0.49 0.24 0.50 0.73 0.31 
Beta 8,584 0.92 0.56 0.87 1.22 0.51 
Momentum 8,584 -0.25 -0.47 -0.26 -0.05 0.30 
Liquidity 8,584 0.88 0.87 0.97 0.99 0.20 
Freefloat 8,584 0.57 0.39 0.57 0.75 0.24 
MSCI 8,584 0.53 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 
Cross-listing 8,584 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 
Cash holdings 8,584 0.16 0.05 0.11 0.22 0.17 
Book-to-market 8,584 0.68 0.31 0.53 0.87 0.57 
Profitability 8,584 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.10 0.15 
Investment 8,584 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.07 
Crisis period return 8,584 -0.40 -0.59 -0.41 -0.23 0.27 
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Table 2. Controlling blockholder categories by country 
Blockholder statistics by country as of December 2006 for the full sample of 8,584 nonfinancial firms. Firms are 
separated into the following categories: (1) ultimately controlled by a family, (2) ultimately controlled by a 
nonfamily blockholder, and (3) widely held. A firm that is ultimately controlled by a family is one in which the 
ultimate stake of the family (members) in aggregate exceeds the 25% threshold. A non-family-controlled firm is one 
with an ultimate blockholder at the 25% threshold that is not affiliated with a family. Non-family-controlled firms 
include firms known to have multiple blockholders that collectively exceed the 25% threshold (so the firm is not 
widely held) but individually do not control the firm at the 25% threshold. A widely held firm is a company that is 
known to have no ultimate owner at the 25% threshold of control. 
 
Country Family-controlled Non-family-controlled Widely held N 
Australia 0.05 0.25 0.70 733 
Austria 0.20 0.49 0.31 35 
Belgium 0.20 0.49 0.31 65 
Brazil 0.08 0.57 0.35 65 
Canada 0.05 0.27 0.68 381 
Chile 0.04 0.54 0.43 56 
Denmark 0.11 0.43 0.46 63 
Finland 0.09 0.39 0.52 79 
France 0.36 0.35 0.29 366 
Germany 0.32 0.37 0.31 292 
Greece 0.20 0.40 0.40 45 
Hong Kong 0.28 0.31 0.41 398 
India 0.08 0.36 0.56 290 
Indonesia 0.03 0.60 0.37 92 
Ireland 0.08 0.14 0.78 36 
Israel 0.14 0.17 0.69 29 
Italy 0.32 0.44 0.24 149 
Japan 0.01 0.10 0.89 1,577 
Korea, Republic of 0.23 0.20 0.56 460 
Malaysia 0.08 0.22 0.70 508 
Netherlands 0.11 0.31 0.58 83 
New Zealand 0.07 0.33 0.60 45 
Norway 0.19 0.41 0.41 69 
Pakistan 0.04 0.43 0.54 28 
Philippines 0.09 0.62 0.29 68 
Portugal 0.15 0.41 0.44 27 
Singapore 0.15 0.32 0.53 347 
South Africa 0.15 0.30 0.55 110 
Spain 0.23 0.25 0.52 79 
Sweden 0.09 0.27 0.64 116 
Switzerland 0.15 0.32 0.53 132 
Taiwan 0.01 0.14 0.85 440 
Thailand 0.05 0.21 0.74 174 
Turkey 0.23 0.56 0.21 111 
United Kingdom 0.09 0.15 0.77 1,036 
     
Total 0.11 0.25 0.64 8,584 
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Table 3. Crisis period stock returns for widely held and blockholder-controlled firms  
Regressions of the dependent variable, crisis period stock returns, on blockholder categories and control variables. 
Crisis period return is the buy-and-hold stock return of a firm from mid-August 2008 to mid-March 2009. All 
specifications include country and two-digit SIC code industry fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the country 
level are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) 
   
Controlling blockholder of any type 0.012*  
 [0.006]  
  Family-controlled  -0.017** 
  [0.007] 
Non-family-controlled   0.023*** 
  [0.007] 
Ln(Firm size) 0.009* 0.008* 
 [0.005] [0.005] 
Leverage -0.146*** -0.143*** 
 [0.025] [0.024] 
Short-term debt -0.003 -0.003 
 [0.011] [0.010] 
Beta -0.084*** -0.084*** 
 [0.014] [0.014] 
Momentum 0.004 0.005 
 [0.007] [0.007] 
Liquidity 0.093 0.094 
 [0.060] [0.060] 
Freefloat -0.033** -0.033** 
 [0.015] [0.015] 
MSCI -0.004 -0.004 
 [0.006] [0.006] 
Cross-listing 0.043 0.043 
 [0.033] [0.033] 
Cash holdings 0.014 0.016 
 [0.015] [0.016] 
Book-to-market 0.014* 0.014* 
 [0.008] [0.008] 
   
Country and industry fixed effects yes yes 
Observations 8,584 8,584 
Adjusted R2 0.325 0.326 
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Table 4. Blockholder control and corporate decisions during the crisis 
Panels A and B report panel regressions with yearly data from 2006 to 2009; dependent variables are shown in the 
column titles. Dividends is the ratio of common dividends to total assets; Short-term debt is the ratio of short-term 
debt to total debt; Credit lines is revolving credit facilities (obtained from Capital IQ) divided by total assets; and 
Equity issues is the percentage change in number of shares outstanding (obtained from Datastream). Cash and 
leverage are as described in Table 1. Crisis period takes the value of one for years 2008 and 2009 and the value of 
zero for years 2006 and 2007. Unless noted otherwise, control variables include profitability, the log of total assets, 
the log of market capitalization, leverage, Q (total assets plus market value of equity minus book value of equity, 
divided by total assets), and firm and industry-year fixed effects. Control variables are excluded as follows: Column 
1 excludes profitability, and Column 5 excludes leverage. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported 
in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
 Panel A: Financing decisions   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   
Dependent variable Cash Dividends Leverage Short-term 
 debt 
Credit  
lines 
Equity  
issues 
  
(Family control) × (crisis period) 0.003 0.000 0.004 -0.005 -0.000 0.004  
 [0.003] [0.001] [0.004] [0.011] [0.003] [0.040]  
(Nonfamily control) × (crisis period) 0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.006 0.002 -0.024  
 [0.003] [0.001] [0.002] [0.006] [0.002] [0.056]  
 
  
  
  
  
Control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes  
Industry-year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes  
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes  
Observations 31,387 31,387 31,387 31,387 16,599 30,356  
Adjusted R2 0.062 0.035 0.132 0.022 0.087 0.007  
Family versus Nonfamily, F-statistic 0.051 0.755 0.412 0.012 0.398 0.315  
p-value 0.823 0.391 0.526 0.915 0.532 0.578  
Panel B: Investment decisions 
  (7) (8) 
Dependent variable  (Capex/assets) Log(1+Capex) 
(Family control) × (crisis period) -0.005** -0.096** 
 [0.002] [0.042] 
(Nonfamily control) × (crisis period) -0.001 -0.000 
 [0.001] [0.026] 
   
Control variables yes yes 
Industry-year fixed effects yes yes 
Firm fixed effects yes yes 
Observations 31,387 31,387 
Adjusted R2 0.040 0.171 
Family versus Non-family, F-statistic 9.144 5.239 
p-value 0.005 0.028 
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Table 5. Investment decisions, blockholder control, and crisis period stock returns 
Panel A reports changes in investment (capital expenditures/assets) from before to after the crisis.  ΔInv1 variables, in 
the second column, are based on the change in investment from the 2006/2007 average to 2008/2009 average; 
variables in the third column are based on the change from 2006 to 2009. The table reports several indicator 
variables that correspond to absolute or relative postcrisis cuts in investment. Panel B reports regressions of the 
dependent variable, crisis period stock returns, on blockholder categories, control variables, and changes in 
investment from before to after the crisis. Crisis period stock returns and control and fixed effect variables are as 
described in Table 3.  Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in brackets. Mediating effect is the 
decrease in the coefficient on Family-controlled from including the column-specific investment cut indicator 
variable. Confidence intervals at the 99% level are obtained by bootstrapping Sobel mediation test statistics with 
5000 replications. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 Panel A: Investment cuts  
  
( )i,2008,2009 i,2006,2007
1
i,2006,2007
AvgInvA - AvgInvA
ΔInv =
AvgInvA
 
 
i,2009 i,2006
2
i,2006
InvA -InvA
ΔInv =
InvA
 
  Mean SD       Mean SD 
Family-controlled 
(N=969) 
 I(ΔInv1 <0) 0.57 0.49 
 
I(ΔInv2 <0) 0.69 0.46 
I(ΔInv1 <Median) 0.52 0.50 
 
I(ΔInv2 <Median) 0.57 0.50 
I(ΔInv1<25th Pctl.) 0.27 0.45 
 
I(ΔInv2<25th Pctl.) 0.30 0.46 
 Non-family-controlled 
(N=2121) 
 I(ΔInv1 <0) 0.47 0.50 
 
I(ΔInv2 <0) 0.55 0.50 
I(ΔInv1 <Median) 0.39 0.49 
 
I(ΔInv2 <Median) 0.41 0.49 
I(ΔInv1<25th Pctl.) 0.20 0.40   I(ΔInv2<25th Pctl.) 0.20 0.40 
 Widely held  
(N=5494) 
 I(ΔInv1 <0) 0.48 0.50 
 
I(ΔInv2 <0) 0.59 0.49 
I(ΔInv1 <Median) 0.39 0.49 
 
I(ΔInv2 <Median) 0.43 0.49 
I(ΔInv1<25th Pctl.) 0.19 0.39 
 
I(ΔInv2<25th Pctl.) 0.21 0.41 
      
 Diff. SE 
  
Diff. SE 
(Family-controlled) –
(Non-fam.-controlled) 
  I(ΔInv1 <0) 0.105*** [0.019] 
 
I(ΔInv2 <0) 0.134*** [0.019] 
I(ΔInv1 <Median) 0.130*** [0.019] 
 
I(ΔInv2 <Median) 0.164*** [0.019] 
I(ΔInv1<25th Pctl.) 0.074*** [0.016] 
 
I(ΔInv2<25th Pctl.) 0.103*** [0.016] 
  
       (Family-controlled) –
(Widely held) 
 I(ΔInv1 <0) 0.093*** [0.017] 
 
I(ΔInv2 <0) 0.100*** [0.017] 
I(ΔInv1 <Median) 0.129*** [0.017] 
 
I(ΔInv2 <Median) 0.144*** [0.017] 
I(ΔInv1<25th Pctl.) 0.087*** [0.014] 
 
I(ΔInv2<25th Pctl.) 0.095*** [0.014] 
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Panel B: Regressions of crisis period stock returns 
Chg. in investment variable:  
 ( )i,2008,2009 i,2006,2007
1
i,2006,2007
AvgInvA - AvgInvA
ΔInv =
AvgInvA
 
 
i,2009 i,2006
2
i,2006
InvA -InvA
ΔInv =
InvA
 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
Family-controlled -0.012 -0.011 -0.013* 
 
-0.012 -0.010 -0.014* 
 
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] 
 
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] 
I(ΔInv <0) -0.048*** 
   
-0.060*** 
  
 
[0.014] 
   
[0.016] 
  I(ΔInv <Median) 
 
-0.050*** 
   
-0.061*** 
 
  
[0.012] 
   
[0.015] 
 I(ΔInv<25th Pctl.) 
  
-0.047*** 
   
-0.052*** 
   
[0.010] 
   
[0.013] 
Non-family-controlled 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 
 
0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 
 
[0.007] [0.007] [0.008] 
 
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] 
       
Mediating effect -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.004*** 
 
-0.005*** -0.007*** -0.004*** 
Bootstrapped confidence 
interval (99%) 
(-0.008, 
-0.003) 
(-0.010, 
-0.004) 
(-0.007, 
-0.002)  
(-0.008, 
-0.002) 
(-0.010, 
-0.004) 
(-0.006, 
-0.001) 
% of total effect mediated 31.9 37.3 23.9  29.8 39.2 21.5 
        
Control variables yes yes yes 
 
yes yes yes 
Country  and industry FE yes yes yes 
 
yes yes yes 
Observations 8,584 8,584 8,584 
 
8,584 8,584 8,584 
R
2 0.333 0.333 0.330   0.337 0.337 0.331 
 
47 
 
Table 6. Financial shocks and investment decisions in groups 
Characteristics of family-controlled and non-family-controlled firms that belong to family or nonfamily groups are 
reported in Panel A. Changes in investment (ΔInv1, ΔInv2) and the investment-cut indicator functions are as defined 
in Table 5. Group size is the number of listed firms within a group. Geographic diversification indicates whether (1) 
or not (0) a group contains firms from more than one country. Panel B compares investment decisions of a subset of 
family firms (the treatment group) with four alternative control groups. The treatment group consists of family-
controlled firms that belong to a group in which at least one firm in the group experiences a large financial shock 
during the crisis (the firm(s) that experience the shock themselves are excluded). Control group 1 contains firms in 
family-controlled groups for which no firm experiences a large shock. Control group 2 includes firms in non-family-
controlled groups for which no firm experiences a large shock. Control group 3 includes non-family-controlled 
groups for which at least one firm experiences a shock (the firm(s) that experience the shock themselves are 
excluded).  Control group 4 contains the union of control group 1 and control group 3. Firms experience a large 
financial shock if their crisis period stock return (as described in Table 1) places them among the lowest 5% (p5), the 
lowest decile (p10), the lowest two deciles (p20), or the lowest three deciles (p30) of returns for the entire sample of 
8,584 firms. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Group characteristics 
  Family-controlled firms 
(1) 
  Non-family-controlled firms 
(2) 
  Diff. (1)-(2) SE 
Number of firms 240 
 
844 
  
 
Crisis period return -0.43 
 
-0.37 
 
-0.06*** [0.018] 
ΔInv1 -0.13  
-0.06 
 
-0.06*** [0.008] 
ΔInv2 -0.09  
-0.00 
 
-0.10*** [0.024] 
I(ΔInv1 <0) 0.87  0.73  
0.14*** [0.031] 
I(ΔInv1 <Median) 0.75  0.46  
0.30*** [0.035] 
I(ΔInv1<25th Pctl.) 0.40  0.22  
0.18*** [0.032] 
I(ΔInv2 <0) 0.73  0.56  
0.17*** [0.035] 
I(ΔInv2 <Median) 0.65  0.45  
0.20*** [0.036] 
I(ΔInv2<25th Pctl.) 0.32  0.22  
0.10*** [0.031] 
Group size 5.02 
 
7.15 
 
-2.13*** [0.538] 
Geographic diversification 0.53 
 
0.50 
 
0.03 [0.037] 
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Panel B: Investment decisions of family groups experiencing large financial shocks versus control groups 
Large shock  
cutoff 
Investment decision  
variable 
Treatment 
group 
(1) 
Control  
group 1 
(2) 
Control  
group 2 
(3) 
Control  
group 3 
(4) 
Control  
group 4 
(5) 
Lowest 5% (p5) Obs 15 220 786 38 258 
ΔInv1 -0.18 -0.12 -0.06 -0.09 -0.12 
(treatment)-(control)  
 
-0.06** -0.12*** -0.09*** -0.06** 
SE 
 
[0.026] [0.031] [0.028] [0.026] 
  
     ΔInv2 -0.29 -0.08 0.00 0.01 -0.06 
(treatment)-(control) 
 
-0.21*** -0.29*** -0.29*** -0.22*** 
SE 
 
[0.063] [0.088] [0.089] [0.067] 
Lowest decile 
(p10) 
Obs 29 198 711 87 285 
ΔInv1 -0.16 -0.12 -0.06 -0.09 -0.11 
(treatment)-(control) 
 
-0.04** -0.10*** -0.07*** -0.05** 
SE 
 
[0.019] [0.022] [0.024] [0.021] 
  
     ΔInv2 -0.22 -0.07 0.01 0.01 -0.05 
(treatment)-(control) 
 
-0.14*** -0.23*** -0.23** -0.17** 
SE 
 
[0.048] [0.060] [0.102] [0.069] 
Lowest quintile 
(p20) 
Obs 46 150 548 174 324 
ΔInv1 -0.13 -0.12 -0.06 -0.07 -0.09 
(treatment)-(control) 
 
-0.01 -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.03** 
SE 
 
[0.017] [0.018] [0.019] [0.017] 
  
     ΔInv2 -0.06 -0.09 0.00 0.04 -0.02 
(treatment)-(control) 
 
0.03 -0.07 -0.1 -0.04 
SE 
 
[0.042] [0.046] [0.068] [0.055] 
Lowest 3 deciles 
(p30) 
  
Obs 66 100 402 245 345 
ΔInv1 -0.13 -0.10 -0.05 -0.07 -0.08 
(treatment)-(control) 
 
-0.03* -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.06*** 
SE 
 
[0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.015] 
  
     ΔInv2 -0.10 -0.06 0.01 0.03 0.00 
(treatment)-(control) 
 
-0.04 -0.11*** -0.13** -0.10** 
SE  [0.041] [0.040] [0.054] [0.048] 
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Table 7. Blockholder control and firm-level expected agency costs 
Regressions of the dependent variable, crisis period stock returns, on blockholder control variables. The table reports 
results for subsamples, split by whether firms have high or low expected agency costs using three criteria: Free cash 
flow ((EBITDA – Capital expenditures)/Assets); Cash holdings (defined in Table 1); and an indicator of whether (1) 
or not (0) the firm uses local GAAP accounting standards. For the free cash flow and cash holdings splits, a firm is 
classified as having high expected agency costs if the variable value is above the sample median and having low 
costs otherwise. Firms are also considered to have high expected agency costs if they use local GAAP accounting 
standards and low costs otherwise. Crisis period stock returns and control and fixed effect variables are as described 
in Table 3. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Sample split by Free cash flow Cash holdings Firm uses local GAAP 
Expected agency 
costs 
High Low High Low High Low 
Family-controlled -0.031** -0.003 -0.024* -0.010 -0.025** -0.007 
 
[0.012] [0.012] [0.013] [0.010] [0.012] [0.008] 
Non-family-
controlled 
0.016** 0.032*** 0.020* 0.028*** 0.021** 0.033*** 
 
 
[0.008] [0.011] [0.010] [0.009] [0.011] [0.009] 
             Control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Country and 
industry FE 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 4,292 4,292 4,292 4,292 5,423 316 
Adjusted R2 0.342 0.303 0.348 0.307 0.346 0.196 
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Table 8. Crisis period stock returns for matched samples  
The table reports firm characteristics by type of control, as of December, 2006 in Panel A; propensity score matching 
results in Panel B; and crisis period returns for family-controlled firms and matched firms in Panel C. All variables 
are as defined in Table 1. In Panel B, propensity scores are estimated using probit regressions of treatment status on 
the control variables and fixed effects used in Table 3. In Panel C, control firms are selected four ways: (1) with 
replacement using all matching firms within the predefined propensity score distance (caliper) δ=0.0001;  (2) with 
replacement using all matching firms within the caliper δ=0.001; (3) using the control firm with the closest 
propensity score (nearest neighbor), with resampling and distance restrictions (control firms can be drawn a 
maximum of three times, nearest neighbor distance cannot exceed δ=0.02); and (4) using the nearest neighbor, 
without resampling or distance restrictions. In Panels A and B, standard errors clustered at the country level are 
reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Precrisis firm characteristics by controlling blockholder type 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  Diff.  
(1)-(2) 
SE  Diff.  
(1)-(3) 
SE 
 Family-
controlled firms 
 Non-family-
controlled firms 
 Widely held 
firms 
       
 Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD      
Ln(Firm size) 5.05 1.96 
 
5.64 1.97 
 
5.44 1.91 
 
-0.585*** [0.076] 
 
-0.383*** [0.067] 
Leverage 0.20 0.17 
 
0.20 0.18 
 
0.19 0.17 
 
0.003 [0.007] 
 
0.011* [0.006] 
Short-term debt 0.50 0.31 
 
0.47 0.31 
 
0.50 0.30 
 
0.029 [0.012] 
 
0.001 [0.011] 
Beta 0.82 0.49 
 
0.85 0.51 
 
0.96 0.50 
 
-0.029** [0.020] 
 
-0.133*** [0.018] 
Momentum 0.06 0.37 
 
0.06 0.38 
 
-0.01 0.39 
 
-0.004 [0.015] 
 
0.065*** [0.013] 
Liquidity 0.87 0.21 
 
0.88 0.22 
 
0.87 0.19 
 
-0.005 [0.008] 
 
0.005 [0.007] 
Freefloat 0.42 0.19 
 
0.43 0.22 
 
0.65 0.22 
 
-0.005 [0.008] 
 
-0.224*** [0.007] 
MSCI 0.38 0.49 
 
0.52 0.50 
 
0.56 0.50 
 
-0.134*** [0.019] 
 
-0.172*** [0.017] 
Cross-listing 0.01 0.07 
 
0.01 0.11 
 
0.01 0.12 
 
-0.008** [0.004] 
 
-0.010** [0.004] 
Cash holdings 0.16 0.16 
 
0.15 0.15 
 
0.17 0.17 
 
0.017*** [0.006] 
 
-0.005 [0.006] 
Book-to-market 0.72 0.64 
 
0.64 0.52 
 
0.69 0.57 
 
0.079*** [0.022] 
 
0.0300 [0.020] 
Panel B: Propensity score matching 
Control group Widely held  Non-family-controlled 
  Coef. SE  Coef. SE 
Size -0.022 [0.021]  -0.076*** [0.022] 
Leverage 0.221 [0.164]  0.415** [0.173] 
Short-term debt 0.045 [0.086]  -0.035 [0.091] 
Beta -0.068 [0.060]  -0.000 [0.063] 
Momentum -0.128 [0.090]  -0.343*** [0.098] 
Liquidity -0.089 [0.175]  0.245 [0.221] 
Freefloat  -2.849*** [0.129]  -0.241* [0.141] 
MSCI 0.030 [0.069]  -0.047 [0.070] 
Cross-listing -0.344 [0.241]  -0.136 [0.283] 
Cash holdings -0.068 [0.161]  0.392** [0.187] 
Book-to-market -0.096* [0.049]  0.020 [0.054] 
Country and industry fixed effects yes   Yes  
Observations/Pseudo R2 6,463 0.358  3,090 0.149 
Panel C: Matched sample analysis of crisis period stock returns 
Matching method Control group Control group 
 
Treatment group 
 
Difference SE p-value 
    Obs. Return   Obs. Return         
Caliper, δ=0.0001 Widely held 918 -0.427 
 
375 -0.481 
 
0.054 0.016 0.001 
Nonfamily control 537 -0.422 
 
391 -0.466 
 
0.044 0.015 0.004 
         Caliper, δ=0.001 Widely held 9049 -0.430 
 
797 -0.473 
 
0.043 0.010 0.000 
Nonfamily control 5037 -0.433 
 
898 -0.470 
 
0.037 0.009 0.000 
         Closest neighbor, 
restricted 
Widely held 920 -0.442 
 
920 -0.470 
 
0.027 0.011 0.018 
Nonfamily control 956 -0.443 
 
956 -0.467 
 
0.024 0.011 0.026 
         Closest neighbor, 
unrestricted 
Widely held 969 -0.438 
 
969 -0.467 
 
0.029 0.011 0.010 
Nonfamily control 969 -0.446   969 -0.467   0.023 0.011 0.045 
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Table 9. Blockholder control and employment decisions during the crisis 
Panels A and B report panel regressions with yearly data from 2006 to 2009; dependent variables are shown in the 
column titles. Crisis period takes the value of one for years 2008 and 2009 and the value of zero for years 2006 and 
2007. Control variables include profitability, the log of total assets, the log of market capitalization, leverage, Q 
(total assets plus market value of equity minus book value of equity, divided by total assets), and firm and industry-
year fixed effects.  Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
(1)  (2)    
Dependent variable Number of employees  Log(Wages) 
(Family control) × (crisis period)  -0.266   -0.009 
  [0.187]   [0.026] 
(Nonfamily control) × (crisis period)  -0.076   0.008 
  [0.107]   [0.022] 
      
Control variables yes  yes  
Industry-year fixed effects yes  yes  
Firm fixed effects yes  yes  
Observations  25,457   21,799 
Adjusted R2  0.054   0.255 
Family versus nonfamily, F-statistic  1.584   0.621 
p-value  0.217   0.436 
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Table 10. Crisis period stock returns for alternative blockholder control definitions 
Regressions of the dependent variable, crisis period stock returns, on alternative definitions of family control in 
Panel A and breakdown by subcategories of nonfamily blockholders in Panel B. In Column 1 of Panel A, family-
controlled firms are defined as in Table 1; in Column 2, family control additionally includes firms in which one or 
more board members control at least 25% of voting rights; in Column 3, the threshold for board members is reduced 
to 20% of voting rights; and, in Column 4, the threshold for board members is reduced to 10% of voting rights. In 
Panel B, noncontrolling blockholders are classified into subcategories of  (1) nonfinancial firms,  (2) financial 
investors that are neither a bank nor an insurance company, (3) governments, (4) banks, or (5) insurance firms. Crisis 
period stock returns and control and fixed effect variables are as described in Table 3.  Standard errors clustered at 
the country level are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Alternative family control definitions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Family-controlled -0.017**    
 [0.007]    
Family-controlled alternative 1  -0.018**   
  [0.007]   
Family-controlled alternative 2   -0.018**  
   [0.007]  
Family-controlled alternative 3    -0.016** 
    [0.007] 
Non-family-controlled 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 
 [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] 
     
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country and industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,584 8,584 8,584 8,584 
Adjusted R2 0.326 0.326 0.326 0.326 
Panel B: Decomposition of nonfamily controlling blockholders 
    (1) (2) % of non-family-controlled firms 
Family-controlled -0.017** -0.017** 
 
  
[0.007] [0.007] 
 Non-family-controlled 0.023*** 
 
100 
  
[0.007] 
  A nonfamily controlling blockholder is… 
   
 
a nonfinancial firm   
 
0.022** 74.2 
   
[0.010] 
 
 
a financial investor 
 
0.024** 15.9 
   
[0.011] 
 
 
a state 
 
0.034 5.8 
   
[0.022] 
 
 
a bank 
 
0.041* 3.5 
   
[0.021] 
 
 
an insurance firm 
 
0.023 0.6 
   
[0.014] 
 Control variables yes yes 
 Country and industry fixed effects yes yes 
 Observations 8,584 8,584 
 Adjusted R2 0.326 0.326 
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Table 11. Crisis period stock returns for alternative event windows  
Regressions of the dependent variable, crisis period stock returns, on blockholder categories and control variables. 
Crisis period stock returns are calculated over six alternative crisis periods. All crisis periods begin in mid-August 
2008. In Columns 1 to 4, the returns are compounded over n months as indicated in the column title, across all 
countries. In Columns 5 and 6, returns are compounded over country-specific time periods. In Column 5, the crisis 
return period ends in the month prior to the country’s first positive monthly return, that is, before the country’s first 
uptick. In Column 6, the crisis period ends in the month prior to the country’s first three consecutive positive 
monthly returns, that is, before the country’s first three consecutive upticks. Control and fixed effect variables are as 
described in Table 3.  Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  Crisis period identical across countries   Country-specific crisis period 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) 
Dependent variable 3 months 
(Nov. 
2008) 
5 months 
(Jan. 2009) 
7 months 
(Mar. 2009) 
9 months 
(May 2009) 
  Until first 
uptick 
Until three 
consecutive 
upticks 
        
Family-controlled -0.009 -0.016** -0.017** -0.016* 
 
-0.020*** -0.016** 
 
[0.007] [0.008] [0.007] [0.008] 
 
[0.007] [0.007] 
Non-family-controlled 0.012** 0.018** 0.023*** 0.022*** 
 
0.023*** 0.027*** 
 
[0.005] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] 
 
[0.006] [0.009] 
        
Control variables yes yes yes yes 
 
yes yes 
Country and industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
 
yes yes 
Observations 8,584 8,584 8,584 8,582 
 
8,584 8,584 
Adjusted R2 0.286 0.396 0.326 0.256   0.289 0.249 
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Table 12. Risk-adjusted crisis period stock returns  
Risk-adjusted crisis period returns are obtained by estimating factor loadings of a stock on one or more risk factors 
and then using these estimates to compute monthly risk-adjusted returns that are compounded over the August 2008 
to March 2009 period to obtain risk-adjusted buy-and-hold crisis period returns. Seven models are used: a single-
factor domestic market model (DOM); a single-factor global market model (GLOBAL); a three-factor model 
incorporating valuation, momentum, and market factors in the spirit of Hou, Karolyi, and Kho (2011), in a domestic 
(HKK3 DOM) and international (HKK3 INT) version; a four-factor model incorporating valuation, size, momentum, 
and market factors, in a domestic (FF4 DOM) and international (FF4 INT) version; and an eight-factor model 
incorporating domestic and international valuation, size, momentum, and market factors. Domestic factors are 
country specific. International factors are calculated for each country as the weighted (by country market 
capitalization) average of all other countries’ domestic factors. In Panel A, factor loadings are estimated over 60 
months preceding the crisis with a minimum of 30 monthly observations (8,524 out of 8,584 sample firms have 
sufficient data). Panel B shows regressions of the dependent variable, risk-adjusted crisis period return, on 
blockholder categories and control variables. Control and fixed effect variables are as described in Table 3 but 
exclude size, momentum, beta, and market-to-book. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in 
brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Estimated factor loadings 
  Family-
controlled 
 Widely  
held 
 Non-family-
controlled 
  Family-
controlled 
 Widely  
held 
 Non-family-
controlled 
    Mean SD   Mean SD   Mean SD 
  
Mean SD   Mean SD   Mean SD 
DOM ˆ
DOM
MKT
β  0.78 0.46 
 
0.91 0.489 
 
0.78 0.47 FF4 INT ˆ
INT
MKT
β  0.74 0.65 
 
0.75 0.62 
 
0.76 0.68 
GLOBAL ˆ
GLOBAL
MKT
β  0.86 0.49 
 
0.99 0.501 
 
0.91 0.55 
 
ˆ INT
SMB
β  0.369 1.63 
 
0.58 1.45 
 
0.47 1.70 
HKK3 DOM ˆ
DOM
MKT
β  0.56 0.50 
 
0.59 0.488 
 
0.52 0.47 
 
ˆ INT
HML
β  0.794 2.26 
 
1.26 2.019 
 
1.02 2.33 
 
ˆDOM
MOM
β  0.09 0.88 
 
0.13 0.779 
 
0.11 0.73 
 
ˆ INT
MOM
β  -0.043 1.10 
 
-0.04 1.04 
 
-0.10 1.02 
 
ˆDOM
HML
β  0.18 0.83 
 
-0.07 1.09 
 
0.12 0.89 FF8 DI ˆ
DOM
MKT
β  0.657 0.86 
 
0.56 0.80 
 
0.52 0.78 
HKK3 INT ˆ
INT
MKT
β  0.73 0.65 
 
0.74 0.618 
 
0.75 0.68 
 
ˆDOM
SMB
β  0.823 0.97 
 
0.99 0.98 
 
0.76 1.15 
 
ˆ INT
MOM
β  0.03 1.07 
 
0.07 0.99 
 
-0.01 0.94 
 
ˆDOM
HML
β  0.267 0.99 
 
0.36 1.05 
 
0.28 0.92 
 
ˆ INT
HML
β  0.87 2.25 
 
1.40 2.014 
 
1.15 2.03 
 
ˆDOM
MOM
β  0.029 0.99 
 
0.07 0.86 
 
0.10 0.82 
FF4 DOM ˆ
DOM
MKT
β  0.68 0.57 
 
0.68 0.521 
 
0.61 0.52 
 
ˆ INT
MKT
β  0.093 1.03 
 
0.24 0.97 
 
0.22 1.01 
 
ˆDOM
SMB
β  0.82 0.88 
 
0.97 0.902 
 
0.75 0.89 
 
ˆ INT
SMB
β  0.037 1.86 
 
0.14 1.54 
 
0.13 1.52 
 
ˆDOM
SMB
β  0.29 0.89 
 
0.37 0.981 
 
0.31 0.87 
 
ˆ INT
HML
β  0.447 2.22 
 
0.60 2.03 
 
0.62 2.07 
 
ˆDOM
MOM
β  -0.02 0.87 
 
0.01 0.751 
 
0.02 0.73 
 
ˆ INT
MOM
β  -0.174 1.28 
 
-0.23 1.11 
 
-0.27 1.13 
Panel B: Risk-adjusted crisis period stock returns for widely held and blockholder controlled firms 
Risk adjustment Domestic 
single-factor 
market 
model  
DOM 
Global single-
factor market 
model 
GLOBAL 
Domestic 
Hou-Karolyi-
Kho 3-factor 
model  
HKK3 DOM 
International 
Hou-Karolyi-
Kho 3-factor 
model  
HKK INT 
Domestic 
Fama-French 
4-factor 
model  
FF4 DOM 
International 
Fama-French 
4-factor 
model 
FF4 INT 
Dom./ Int. 
Fama-French 
8-factor 
model 
FF8 DI 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Family-controlled -0.028*** -0.035*** -0.020* -0.043*** -0.024* -0.039*** -0.035** 
 
[0.007] [0.012] [0.010] [0.015] [0.012] [0.014] [0.015] 
Non-family-controlled 0.015* 0.020** 0.015* 0.017 0.012 0.018 0.023 
 
[0.008] [0.007] [0.008] [0.014] [0.010] [0.013] [0.016] 
       Control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Country and industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 8,524 8,524 8,524 8,524 8,524 8,524 8,524 
Adjusted R2 0.192 0.184 0.129 0.092 0.104 0.085 0.083 
 
